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ABSTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION
The ”Peer-to-Peer” communication model has introduced
a significant paradigm shift in the way users share the re-
sources with each other and communicate among themselves.
Structured P2P systems based on Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) paradigm are increasingly adopted in building mas-
sively scalable and highly available data management sys-
tems [1]. The academic research community has pursued a
wide range of such systems which includes- Chord [2], Pastry
[3], P-Grid [4], and CAN [5]. DHT based scalable storage
infrastructures are embraced beyond the realms of academia
also [6, 7, 8].
Because of the promising characteristics such as massive
scalability, zero administration overhead, low cost, and au-
tonomous control, the structured P2P systems are ideal for
realizing collaborative networked systems built from resources
shared and owned by a cooperative groups of users. Coop-
erative File System (CFS) [9] reports an efficient robust file
system realized with a completely DHT- based decentralized
architecture. CFS achieves the performance of traditional
FTP- server based file systems, and promises a high robust-
ness to node failures and high availability of the data using
replication. A cooperative backup system is proposed in
[10] where set of hosts form a cooperative P2P network and
backup the data of each other. Each participating computer
is assigned to a small set of geographically distributed com-
puters which share their storage to backup the data of the
computer. Thus they achieve a cooperative backup scheme
which is orders of magnitude cheaper over traditional com-
mercial tape based backup schemes. FARSITE [11] aims
at a serverless, secure, and scalable file system targeted for
working environments involving few thousand hosts typi-
cally a corporate working environment. Efforts are made
to build distributed semantic storage infrastructures on top
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of P2P cooperative storage. The NEPOMUK project [12]
uses P2P semantic storage system and extends the personal
computer into a collaborative environment and improves the
state of art in online collaboration and personal data man-
agement. The TEAM project [13] creates a collaborative
P2P semantic infrastructure for lightweight knowledge shar-
ing optimized for distributed software teams. GridVine [14]
system builds a P2P semantic RDF store which handles the
semantic heterogeneity using schema mappings inserted by
peers. A query on the network automatically gets reformu-
lated using these mappings. There are number of P2P based
RDF triple stores proposed in the literature [15, 16].
However, for such systems to be widely adopted, there is
an obvious need for securing the storage and communica-
tion infrastructures. Security, privacy are very critical re-
quirements for any collaborative knowledge sharing system,
which motivate more and more users to participate in the
system. Any secured system is incomplete had it failed to
consider the access Control aware searches and data accesses
as its inherent design goals. P2P collaborative systems make
such task challenging given that they lack any centralized
control and they are realized on top of untrusted resources
or nodes. We identify the following concrete goals which
must be realized to pursue such a system:
• Securing the communication infrastructure- Only in-
tended participants should be desirably, part of the
collaborative system. The communication messages
exchanged should be visible only to such participants
and the communication infrastructure should be free
from eavesdropping.
• Securing the access to the resources shared- Out of all
the intended participants of the network, only certain
authorized users should be able to access a particu-
lar shared resource. The access control in a system is
generally configured using some kind of Access Con-
trol Lists [17]. A secure system must support access
control aware search and data accesses.
In this paper, we deal with the second part of the security re-
quirements described above. For the first part, we present a
brief overview of a simple solution for the P2P secured com-
munication infrastructure that is implemented in the P-Grid
project [18, 19]. Later, we demonstrate an extendible modu-
lar design for the envisioned Access Control aware P2P data
management system (referred as ACPeer, for convenience,
in the rest of the paper).
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
XXX
2. RELATEDWORK
The problem of controlling accesses on shared data is
widely studied by the research community and researchers
proposed a number of access control models and techniques
to enable access of the files or resources by only intended
users. Most of the existing operating systems implement
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [20] where the owners
of the files specify the access privileges for the resources they
publish. The management of access privileges is completely
at the discretion of the owner only. An arbitrary user can be
the owner for the data which he accessed from elsewhere and
start sharing this copy with others by managing access rights
for this copy. Thus, in DAC- based systems, data can leak to
users or processes unintended by the original owner, which
can not be restricted. Mandatory Access Control [20] ad-
dresses this problem by introducing privilege levels to users
and resources. The system monitors the information flow
between entities with various privileges and prevents an en-
tity at lower privileges accessing resources configured with
higher privileges. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [20]
provides scalable alternative for Access Control Lists, where
privileges are configured for a role, users assume. There is
no need for configuring the privileges for each and every user
of the system.
Granularity of access control is inherently dependant on
the kind of access control model deployed in the system. In
RBAC, the policy specification granularity can not be finer
than the level of roles. Assigning privileges to a single user
is not possible unless a special unique role is created for
user alone. However, this is not the case with DAC, since
it allows granularity to per-user level. If the storage system
does not allow flexible handling of such granularity, it leads
to data leakage as observed in [21].
Any ACPeer system can be assumed to be analogous to
a widely-studied problem of hosting files or data on un-
trusted storage since data or index is stored often on un-
known (and hence untrusted) peers. Such systems use cryp-
tographic techniques to realize access control aware data ac-
cesses. The Plutus [22] describes a file system that aggre-
gates files with similar privileges into groups and encrypts
all the files in the group with a single key. The key man-
agement and distribution is in user’s hands and is done out-
of-band. SiRiUS [23] describes a filesystem which provides
access control in the untrusted storage model using public
key cryptography for all metadata operations. Similar pub-
lic key cryptography technique was used in FARSITE too
[11]. SUNDR [24] presents a network file system to store
data securely on untrusted servers. Any violation of access
privileges or unauthorized modifications by malicious users
can be detected by the owners. The work was primarily
motivated by to design safe code repository hosting servers
of few open-source and commercial projects as traidional
centralized storage were observed to be vulnerable to mali-
cious attacks. Most of these works target at securely out-
sourcing storage to third party storage providers. In [21],
the authors address this problem in detail and introduce a
robust access control framework using cryptographic tech-
niques. They improve on the existing access control model
for UNIX-like systems and apply it to the accesses on data
hosted on untrusted storage providers.
However, to be discussed later, the data access patterns
in structured P2P systems might vary from that of the above
systems. These P2P systems publish certain metadata called
index, for each resource shared. Peers first consult this index
before accessing the original resources. There is very little
work done in the literature on access control mechanisms for
structured P2P systems, whose presence is increasingly ex-
panding into a number of different application domanis. The
work in [25] provides a policy based access control framework
for P2P grid systems. An access control system for collab-
orative environments involving mobile and P2P systems is
addressed in [26]. Access Control satisfiability is used in
[27] to compute the trustworthiness of acquaintances in a
P2P overlay network. Modeling access control in the case of
P2P collaborative systems is addressed in [28]. The authors
propose a fine granular and attribute based access control
framework where each peer assumes a group role and an ap-
plication role. Then an access control policy which maps
various roles and permissions is configured and the under-
lying framework executes the policy. Our work is based on
the lines of PHera [29] which proposes a scalable and fine-
grained access control framework for P2P infrastructures.
They deal with super peer based P2P overlays where, sub
peers specify their access control policy and the super peer
enforces it on their behalf. Any invalid request for a resource
will not cross the super peers and reach the peers. Policy
statements of individual policies are grouped for scalability
and performance reasons. However, this work assumes that
all super peers are trustworthy to enforce the access control
policy of the sub peers. In any case, the sub peers, before
processing an access request, can still verify the access con-
trol decisions of super peers.
It may appear vaguely that ACPeer is a variant of a P2P
anonymous data sharing systems, a problem well addressed
in the literature. We contrast both types of systems in the
following and argue that solution for the latter can not meet
the requirements of the former.
2.1 Access Control vs Anonymity
Systems that allow anonymous sharing and publishing of
data are of vital importance to protect the identity of the
sender and the receiver. Anonymity in such systems refer to
sender anonymity- hiding the identity of the sender, receiver
anonymity- hiding the identity of the final destination of a
resource request (in DHT based P2P systems, it is the node
responsible for the keyword in the request query), and the
storage anonymity- hiding the actual location of data which
might be different from the receiver anonymity. Its unar-
guable that P2P overlay technologies emerged as the only
alternative for realizing anonymity-preserving data publish-
ing systems, which do not need any centralized resources
for their functioning, thus eliminating a major source of
anonymity compromise. There exists a number of studies
devoted to anonymous systems in the literature [30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35]. The anonymous P2P systems are introduced to
stop censorship and filtering of a particular content to make
it unavailable for the world. Freenet [30] is a very popular
unstructured anonymous P2P system and the Gnutella [36],
Kazaa [37] also provide anonymity through the use of the
random overlay topology and flooding based routing proto-
col. But such systems suffer from lack of guaranteed look
up, and Agyaat [31] brings the anonymity to the structured
P2P systems by creating clouds on top of a P2P overlay to
hide the sender and the receiver identities.
However, even though both the anonymous P2P systems
and the ACPeer systems aim at preserving privacy of the
data against unintended accesses, both have separate design
goals and solution space. Here, we try to highlight the major
differences.
1. In anonymous P2P systems, the access to a resource
is open. Anybody can access a resource and the infor-
mation related to who is initiating the request, who is
holding the resource is hidden. In such systems, we
can not control the accesses to resources, which is the
main objective of an ACPeer system.
2. Systems preserving sender’s anonymity protect the iden-
tity of the sender, but in general, any access control
systems needs to know the identity of the requester
to evaluate the Access Control Function, which is for-
mally defined in Section 3.5. Hence, systems targeting
at only requester anonymity can not meet our objec-
tive.
3. In the case of systems providing only the receiver’s
anonymity, ACF can be enforced by the receiving peers.
But we need a secure communication infrastructure
and faithful ACF execution by the peers, which may
not be the design goals of such systems. The addi-
tional protocol overheads introduced in the process
of anonymizing the receiver peers is unintended for
ACPeer systems.
4. It is clear that systems providing both sender and re-
ceiver anonymity can not meet the objective because of
the above reasons. Systems preserving storage anonymity
alone, also fail to replace ACPeer systems for the same
reasons.
2.2 Secured P2P Communication Infrastruc-
ture
Any P2P system which boasts of secured access control en-
forcement should first have a secured communication infras-
tructure in place. There exist widely adopted standards such
as Secured Socket Layer (SSL) [38] for secured point-to-point
communication. SSL and its updated version Transport
Layer Security (TLS) [39] are very well established standards
for secured communications over unreliable channels. SSL
claims to address every aspect of secured communication-
namely authentication- peers on either side of a communi-
cation channel should authenticate each other, encryption-
all the messages should be encrypted at the sender and de-
crypted at the receiver, no unauthorized person should be
able to listen to the messages, message integrity- the re-
ceiving peers should be able to detect any tampering of the
messages transmitted by malicious eavesdroppers. A simple
SSL- based communication infrastructure was implemented
for the structured P2P system P-Grid. One notable instance
of SSL based P2P implementation is JXTA [41], which is
a widely popular open source project that defines a set of
protocols for adhoc P2P computing. SSL encryption is in-
creasingly being used in P2P networks to deliver large files,
video over the Internet [40]. The volume of the encrypted
P2P traffic has risen ten-fold in just a year and represents
more than half of all P2P traffic.
User identities or credentials in the form of digital cer-
tificates form the base of security in SSL. The management
of certificates in a decentralized setting is tricky and chal-
lenging. One trivial solution could be using self-signed cer-
tificates. JXTA uses self-signed certificates, thus eliminating
the need for a central control. In collaborative environments
coming up with a simple decentralized hierarchial scheme
where each group of peers have a single authority to sign
their certificates, is an easy task. This reduces the sizes of
the trust stores the peer implementations should keep track
of and eases the management of such stores. However, de-
veloping a scalable, decentralized certificate management is
beyond scope of this paper.
3. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
In this section, we present the problem statement along
with the necessary background. Then we sketch the model-
ing of various aspects of the system along with the modeling
of the access control policy and we highlight our approach
to the problem briefly.
3.1 System Description
The goal of the paper is build a ACPeer system using
a structured P2P storage. Each structured P2P system is
characterized in general, by two primitives- namely put(key,
value) and get(key) where the former is used to publish
a data object into the network, where as the latter is used
to retrieve the object. key is a key to uniquely locate a
resource item in the network, and the value is either the
physical location of the data object or data object itself.
Users/applications use the system to publish and search re-
sources/data objects (files, RDF triples data, for example).
The exact system architecture and functioning is described
later.
One or more users access the ACPeer system using the ap-
plication built on top. The system consists of several peers
(or nodes) which contribute to the storage and processing
needs. Thus, in general, either one or more users directly
map to a peer which is not configured apriori. However, for
ease of description, we assume that a single user in the ap-
plication domain maps to a single peer in the P2P network,
and hence the word user, peer, node refer to the same. How-
ever, we claim that the mechanisms discussed do not have
any inherent dependency on the user to peer mapping.
In an ACPeer systems, users publish resources and asso-
ciate access control rules to the data objects which determine
who in the network is authorized to access the resource. The
exact semantics and the modeling of the policy rules is for-
mally done later in the paper. Each resource has a owner
user who is the user first inserting the resource with a certain
key, into the network. Other authorized peers can search and
retrieve the resource using above primitive. As mentioned
earlier, the system adopts a DAC model which does not
deal with what happens after an authorized peer retrieves
the resource. For example, the system does not prevent an
authorized user retrieving a resource from the network and
publish it again with different identifier, thus becoming an
owner. However, it is to be noted that resources retrieved
by peers are not automatically available in the system un-
less they are published explicitly, thus ensuring that only
the original owner has full control on the resource.
3.2 What is an ACPeer system?
As noted earlier, an ACPeer system ensures that published
data objects are accessed only by legitimate users. Such a
system is formally defined as follows:
In an ACPeer system, there exists, for each published re-
source r,
1. a set of data, to be protected from illegitimate accesses
called ACData(r)
2. an access control policy rule P, which maps r to a set
of peers that can access the ACData, which is more
formalized in later part of the paper
If Data(u) is all the data that a user/peer u can access, then
ACPeer system must ensure that,
ACData(r) ⊆ Data(u)
if and only if u ∈ P (r), for any resource r.
Each resource has two type of data entities to be protected-
the resource itself and the Index which is stored in the
network in the form of (key, value) pairs discussed above.
ACData(r) is a subset of the set of data entities for re-
source r. The ACPeer systems can be categorized based on
the members of ACData set, as explained in the following.
3.3 Levels of Access Control
What constitutes the set ACData for a resource deter-
mines the level of access control the system can provide.
Based on various requirements of the applications built on
top of ACPeer system, we can categorize an ACPeer system
as
1. Level-0 system if ACData(r) = ∅, for each resource
r published in the system. This system does not pro-
vide any access control on the resources. Such a sys-
tem is suitable for applications which provide raw P2P
storage. The conventional P2P systems- Chord, Pas-
try, etc. are examples of Level-0 systems.
2. Level-1 system if ACData(r) = {r}, for each re-
source r published in the system. Such a system only
protects the resource from illegitimate accesses. Such
a system is useful, for example, to host document pub-
lishing systems, where every document can be accessed
only by authorized paid members, but the index of the
documents is world-readable. So any user can search
with in the index. For examples systems like IEEEX-
plore are Level-1 systems.
3. Level-2 system if ACData(r) = {Index(r), r} where
Index(r) represents the index of resource r. This in-
dex may include in addition to the (key,value) pairs,
any sophisticated metadata like descriptors, keywords
of the data object. Level-2 systems provide the high-
est control on the published resources. These systems
realize access control aware searches [46] on the index.
In addition to the above classification, one can imagine a
system where ACData covers Index only partially, where in,
access to the value field of the (key,value) pair is controlled
but the key field is not. Such systems can be labeled as
Level-1.5 system in this context. Such systems allow any
user in the system to figure out whether a resource with
particular identifier exists in the system, without revealing
anything more about the resource. To be seen later, a Level-
2 system entails a non-negligible overhead in terms of search
and publication cost over a Level-1.5 system.
Here, we try to scrutinize the transaction flow in a typical
structured P2P system and illustrate the levels of ACPeer
system with examples. Figure. 1 illustrates the typical work
Figure 1: A typical transaction flow in a structured
P2P system.
flow of a structured P2P system. A peer F wishes to pub-
lish a resource with name report in the network. This node
is termed as the owner node (o-node) in the model. The
underlying routing algorithm decides to host the index in-
formation about this resource (Index(report), say a pair
(report, F )) on node E which is termed as the responsible
node (r-node). Any peer can query for this resource using
the get- primitive. In the figure, the querying peer (q-node)
A queries for this item and the query is forwarded to node
E via several intermediate nodes (i-node).
Assume that the owner node gives only node A the re-
quired access rights for this resource.
• In Level-0 system, since access control is not in place,
node A and a node like C which is not intended by the
owner, can query the system to get the location of the
owner node, and then retrieve the resource.
• In Level-1 system, both nodes A and C figure out that
node F hosts the resource report.
• In Level-1.5 system, node A can only figure out that
report is hosted on node F , but node C will get reply
for query on report in such a way that it can infer
that a resource with identifier report is published in
the system, but it can not make out about where it is
hosted.
• In Level-2 system, only node A can successfully know
where it is hosted. Node C can not even know whether
a resource with such identifier is published in the sys-
tem or not.
3.4 Problem Statement
Given a structured P2P system, realize a Level-2 like
ACPeer system.
3.5 Modeling Access Control Policy
A typical access control policy categorizes the incoming
access requests in terms of the principals identified in the
system such as user identifier or group identifier, and maps
each available resource to one or more of such principals
which can access the data. For instance, access requests can
be categorized based on the source or the user where the
requests are coming from, where the users or groups of users
form the principals. The categorization criterion determines
the list of principals available in the system. Categorization
can happen based on the roles the requesters assume in the
system. Another way of categorization is kind of relation the
requester is having with the publisher of the resource, on the
social network. Hence, any access control policy at a peer
which defines access privileges for each resource in terms of
the set of principals available in the system. In DAC model,
it can be represented by an Access Control Function (ACF)
of a peer p which can be formalized as follows:
ACF p : ℵ →
⋃
∀r∈<p
ACData(r)
where ℵ is set of principals and <p is the set of resources
published by p. The set ℵ grows exponentially w.r.t the
number of peers in the system, ℵ is in the order of 2|Θ|
where Θ is the set of peers.
The above policy modeling assumes only read access priv-
ileges for the principals. In general, the policy specifica-
tion should consider the set of allowed operations on the re-
sources published. To be explained further, the paper does
not address the issue of principals management in the net-
work. In section 3.6, we discuss the assumptions we make in
related to access control policy specification. In section 3.8,
we present a general approach to the given problem which
does not make assumption of a particular model of the prin-
cipals.
3.6 Assumptions
In order to exercise greater flexibility to concentrate on
the original problem of designing ACPeer system, we resort
to few simple assumptions, which are enumerated in the
following.
1. Unless specified explicitly, we assume the storage model
where the resource is stored with the o− nodes itself,
and the value part of (key, value) points to the loca-
tion of the o − node. The solutions are adoptable to
other storage models where resource is stored inside
the network on the r − nodes for example.
2. Since establishing identity of a principal securedly is
a critical prerequisite for any access control system,
we assume the availability of the same. We assume
existence of a secured function which maps an access
request to one of the principals available in the sys-
tem, using which the reference monitor can either allow
or deny the access request based on the policy state-
ment. We assume the existence of PKI infrastructure
which includes certificate authorities (CAs) who can
sign identity and public key certificates of users, a key
distribution mechanism. Some of the approaches de-
pend on this infrastructure for all aspects of the sys-
tem functioning- authentication, publishing, searching,
where as some solutions use the infrastructure only for
authentication of incoming access requests.
3. We assume that in a typical knowledge sharing system,
there are many reads but rare updates or writes on the
same data. Hence we concentrate only on controlling
the read accesses on the data published and leave con-
trolled write accesses as a future study. However, with
little enhancements, the solution mechanisms can be
fine tuned to write accesses also.
4. We assume a simplistic threat model where peers try
to abuse the system by trying to access the data they
are not authorized to access. Otherwise, they coop-
erate with other aspects of the routing protocol- for
instance, we do not assume that peers delete the data
they have to host as per the protocol, and peers do
not abuse with the routing algorithm of the P2P in-
frastructure. This simplistic model relieves us from
several complicated issues and enables us to concen-
trate on only the access control aspects of the data
accesses. However, we recognize that mitigating every
possible abuse on the system is beyond the scope of
the paper.
3.7 Motivation
Before proceeding to realization of Level-2 system, here we
provide the motivation behind envisioning such a system.
• Imagine a P2P information system inside a corporate
company- managers, employees, and temporarily hired
contract staff share the resources over the P2P plat-
form. In open P2P systems (like Level-0 or Level-1
systems), even the contractors can place queries for
say appraisal review related docs and infer something
like whether appraisal of some employee is ready or not
or is it modified after the employee met the manager,
if this kind of metadata is included in the Index of
the resources. Typically mangers may want only other
managers or some employees whom he chooses, to see
what he is sharing in the network, in spite of the fact
that the actual access to resources is restricted. Imag-
ine a knowledge sharing system. Adversaries can query
the system with few keywords and infer what kind of
knowledge a peer is contributing to the system- say
whether any docs in the system exist about virus xyz?.
A Level-0 or Level-1 system can easily expose such
data through uncontrolled index accesses on the meta-
data or index. The authors in [21] demonstrate the
threats due to such data leakage in traditional file sys-
tems.
• In a Level-2 system, a query from an ineligible peer is
stopped as early as possible from a typical successful
query-reply cycle which saves on the communication
costs. Such a peer does not get any useful reply packets
for a query term, it can not proceed further on the
transaction flow.
• In case of very popular resources, usually the load on
the serving peer is high. If the queue size on such peer
grows beyond an acceptable limit, all future requests
may be denied which might include requests from eli-
gible peers. So a Level-2 system like ACF enforcement
tries to fill the queue with only valid peers.
• In systems like GridVine, a single query translates into
multiple queries recursively, when matching semantic
mappings or translations are found in the network.
In Level-2 like systems, we can prevent queries from
unauthorized peers from going deep into the network
recursively.
• More importantly, in some systems, there may not be
any physical resource associated with the index to en-
force access control at the end nodes. In this case r = ∅
and ACData(r) = Index(r). The resource itself would
be stored in the network e.g., in the form of an RDF
tuple. In such case, the only available point of ACF
enforcement is the network itself. Level-0 or Level-1
systems do not control accesses in such cases. In the
TEAM project [13], peers share knowledge which is in
the form of instances of OWL ontologies, each knowl-
edge unit is published into the network and does not
have any associated physical resource on the publisher
node. Such systems need Level-2 AcPeer systems.
• In second and third types of storage models, the re-
source does not reside with the publisher. Hence, a
Level-2 system is required for such storage models where
the same technique used for enforcing ACF on index
can be applied on the resource also. More over, its
common in data sharing systems to split a published
resource into fragments and distributing the fragments
in the network, for enabling faster parallel download-
ing of popular big files. In this case, some fragments
will be accessed without the knowledge of the owner,
which demand a Level-2 system like ACF enforcement.
• An adversary may query the system for particular key-
words and launch DoS attacks on the serving peers
using the information he/she gets in the replies.
• If index is open, an adversary can construct the his-
tory of who are all searching for the key it is hosting
from the queries it receives- and this valuable history
may be used to launch some other kind of attacks. In
Level-2 systems, this is not possible, because a random
adversary can not know about the index just because
it hosts it, unless it has access to it.
• As explained earlier, sophisticated indexing mechanism
can be built on top of the basic indexing primitives
provided in the form of key,value pairs. An inverted
index of the documents published, is one of such pos-
sibilities. Any indexed document can be constructed
with ease from the open inverted indexes of the docu-
ment [44]. P2P information retrieval systems based on
distributed inverted indexes are pursued in the litera-
ture [45]. Hence, a Level-2 like ACPeer system would
be a first step towards access controlled P2P informa-
tion retrieval systems.
3.8 Our Approach
The goal of the paper is to enforce the ACF of the pub-
lishing peers so as to meet the requirements of the Level-2
system. In the literature, entities which enforce the ACF
are referred as reference monitors [20]. From Figure. 1, it
is clear that a Level-2 system requires to realize reference
monitors on nodes other than the owner. Hence, in the case
of P2P ACPeer systems, there exist two points to realize
reference monitor i.e., o-node and r-node. Implementing a
trusted reference monitors in the latter case is trivial as it is
done locally. However, realizing reference monitors on for-
mer (i.e., o-nodes) is non-trivial and can be done in several
ways as demonstrated later in the paper.
As presented earlier, any ACPeer system has mainly two
concerns- first, modeling an access control policy- selecting
the set of principals present in the system, and second, im-
plementing a trusted reference monitor. To address the first
concern, in stead of restricting ourselves to a specific type
of principal modeling (such as role based modelling), we
present a generic approach which assumes a general principal
and sketch a modular design for the targetted Level-2 sys-
tem, where, we provide a general framework for the second
part of the problem- implementing trusted reference moni-
tor, into which a module which solely deals with a specific
type of principals is plugged in, in order to realize a com-
plete functional Level-2 system to be used by applications.
For example, if we pursue an encryption based mechanism
for implementing a reference monitor, we assume encrypt-
ing the resources per user if the policy models principals
in terms of users, or encryption per role if a model based
on roles is pursued. For illustration purposes, we assume a
conventional modeling of principals- users and groups where
each peer is assumed to be a user. Groups of peers can form
a single principal.
The most critical and challenging objective of any ACPeer
system is to guarantee a faithful execution of ACF. It must
be noted that, on a Level-2 system, ACF must be enforced
on Index(r) which is essentially hosted on peers other than
the publisher itself. The paper is mostly devoted to this
problem of implementing trusted reference monitors on re-
mote peers keeping the Level-2 system requirements. Some
of the solution approaches to be discussed in the paper make
an attempt to realize first a Level-1.5 system which would
be extended, then, to Level-2 system.
4. SOLUTION MECHANISM
In this section, we explore the problem of designing a
Level-2 ACPeer system in detail, introduce the following
mechanisms to solve the problem, and provide a comparison
of all the mechanisms.
1. Disjoint P2P Networks (DPN)
2. Controlled Queries (CQ)
3. Controlled Replies (CR)
4. Hybrid Solution
The DPN approach address the problem by constructing dis-
joint networks depending on certain objective as explained
in next section. The CQ approach realizes the reference
monitors in the network using encryption techniques where
as CR, in an encryption- free manner. The hybrid solu-
tion attempts to inherit properties of both the CQ and CR
approaches. These solutions are discussed in detail in the
following sub sections.
4.1 Disjoint P2P Networks (DPN)
A simple and trivial way of realizing a Level-2 system is by
creating multiple independent P2P networks each with its
own resources published and the peers participating. A new
network is constructed based on, which one of the search cost
or publication cost has to be optimized. If publication cost
has to be optimized where each peer publishes each of its
resources at most once irrespective of number of principals
authorized to access, a network with only peers correspond-
ing to authorized principals is created. Resource is published
Algorithm 1 Simplified algorithms for DPN
{The algorithms are simplified for brevity. Each step of al-
gorithm may involve additional actions than mentioned-
for example, creating a network involves informing the
members and issuing membership certificates. Each algo-
rithm is run at each peer p in the system.}
Publish_MinPubCost()
{Algorithm for the case of the optimizing publication
cost}
for all each resource r ∈ <p do
create a network with principals n ∈ ((ACF p)−1)(r)
publish ACData(r) into the network
end for
Search_MinPubCost()
{Algorithm for the case of the optimizing publication
cost}
for all every member network do
search for the item in the network
end for
Publish_MinSearchCost()
{Algorithm for the case of the optimizing search cost}
for all resource r ∈ <p do
for all principal n ∈ ((ACF p)−1)(r) do
publish ACData(r) into the network corresponding
to the principal
end for
end for
Search_MinSearchCost()
{Algorithm for the case of the optimizing search cost}
for all member principal do
search in corresponding network
end for
into this network so that it is visible only the o− node and
the member principals. In this case, a q−node has to search
in each of the network it participates being part of one of
the member principals. Each o − node has full control on
the members of a network and can use simple admission
control protocol where the o−node issues a digitally signed
certificate to each valid member peer.
A DPN approach which aims at optimizing the search
cost, will one network per each principal so that search by a
q−node is limited by the number of principals it is member
of. However, the publication cost here is equal to the number
of principals that are authorized to access a resource. Each
principal will control the membership of the network in the
same way as explained above. In case of principals with
a group of peers, one peer can be elected as administrator
which controls the issuance of the membership certificates.
This way DPN ensures that index is available only to the
authorized peers, by modeling the access control problem as
an admission control problem. Access control is exercised
at the time of joining the network itself. The problem of
admission control in P2P systems is well addressed [47, 48],
which is not discussed here.
However, DPN approach has inherent scalability and ef-
ficiency problems, as the number of networks needed would
explode exponentially. For the first case, the number of net-
works would be in the order O(| Θ | 2|ℵ|). In the latter case,
it would be in the order of O(| Θ || ℵ |). The network and
the participants in a network become highly unmanageable
as the number of resources and peers increase. However, the
advantage with this approach is, one can exercise the finest
granular access control- right to the level of per principal-
resource access constraints. This is useful for applications
that can not tolerate even minimum amount of information
leakage to unauthorized peers.
The DPN solution tries to attack the problem of Level-
2 ACPeer system, by modeling the access control around
o-nodes (refer Figure. 1) only and hence end up in non-
scalable systems. By moving parts of ACF enforcement to
entities responsible for respective phases of a transaction (as
described in Figure. 1), we can design better solutions w.r.t
both scalability and manageability, which will be elaborated
further in the following sections. Such an approach results in
primarily two alternatives which realize the Level-2 system
by executing ACF at either q-node itself or at r-node, which
are termed as Controlled Queries and Controlled Replies ap-
proaches respectively.
4.2 Controlled Queries (CQ)
The intuition behind the CQ based approach is to embed
ACF into the index generation process itself by encrypting
the resource identifier space. By ensuring that only the au-
thorized principals get access to the keys, the o − nodes
can ensure proper enforcement of the ACF. Such encrypted
items can be hosted safely on any peer in the network. Only
the peers with valid encryption keys can pose queries for the
items and decrypt the results received. There is no need of
any ACF execution on r − nodes in the network, as it is
already enforced at query formation itself, thus completing
the ACF execution on index (at q − node itself). Ability to
generate a query with valid query terms itself is considered
as the necessary authorization required for the access. This
way of ACF execution on the index, backed by the ACF
execution on the resources at the o-nodes completes the re-
alization of a Level-2 system. Name obfuscation schemes
were used before, for censorship-resistant publishing in P2P
systems [30]. The most promising advantage of a CQ based
solution is- there is it does not need any changes to the rout-
ing or indexing protocol of the underlying P2P system. A
access-controlled query works like any other query and pro-
cessing the requests is quite transparent to the peers and the
network. It can be applied on top of any existing structured
P2P system.
Based on the number of keys to be distributed, the CQ
based approach can be used to realize either a Level-1.5 or
Level-2 system. In the following, we first introduce a Level-
1.5 CQ based ACPeer system which will be tuned to a Level-
2 system later with additional encryption keys and increased
search cost.
Level-1.5 ACPeer System- Publishing and Searching: One sim-
ple way of realizing CQ based Level-1.5 system is the follow-
ing which uses public key cryptography: each principal (a
user or a group of users) in the system (from the set of prin-
cipals ℵ) will have its own trusted pair of public, private
keys. The index is inserted into the network after encrypt-
ing it with the public key of all the authorized principals as
dictated by the ACF of the peer. So a peer can search in-
dex published to a principal if it knows the respective public
key and can interpret the results only if it has the respec-
tive private key. This simple solution suffers from dictionary
attacks on the index thus compromsing the semantics of a
Level-1.5 system, which is explained in more detail in later
part of the subsection.
Algorithm 2 Simplified algorithms for CQ
1: {An instance of the algorithms is run at each peer p in
the system.}
2: Publish()
3: for all resource r ∈ <p do
4: for all principal n ∈ ((ACF p)−1)(r) do
5: publish ACData(r) into the network
6: {This step translates to Publish Level1.5() or Pub-
lish Level2() depending on which system is de-
ployed. }
7: end for
8: end for
9: Search()
10: for all member principal do
11: search for the item with principal’s credentials
12: {This step translates to Search Level1.5() or
Search Level2() depending on which system is
deployed. }
13: end for
14: Publish_Level1.5(resource r, principal n)
15: encrypt key of Index(r) with public key of n using the
deterministic encryption algorithm
16: encrypt value of Index(r) with public key of n using
the non-deterministic encryption algorithm
17: publish encrypted (key, value) pair into the network
18: Search_Level1.5(resource r, principal n)
19: encrypt key corresponding to r with public key of n
using the deterministic encryption algorithm and send
query
20: decrypt the result with private key of n
21: Publish_Level2(resource r, principal n)
22: generate a secret key and encrypt (key, value) of
Index(r) with this secret key
23: publish encrypted (key, value) pair into the network
24: encrypt the secret key with public key of n and publish
into the network
25: {If the secret key is distributed to n using out-of-band
mechanisms, the above step is not required}
26: Search_Level2(resource r, principal n)
27: for all potential publisher do
28: {or for each secret key used to publish to n}
29: retrieve the corresponding secret key
30: encrypt key corresponding to r with the secret key
and send query
31: decrypt the result
32: end for
Since encryption has to be done for each authorized prin-
cipal, an ACData item, must be published as many times as
the number of such principals specified in the policy, for the
resource. This overhead is in the order of O(| ℵ |).which can
not be avoided if encryption techniques are used to realize
ACPeer system. Existence of several copies of the same piece
of data is greatly disadvantageous when resource updates are
made. Similarly, a search for interested index entry must be
done separately for each principals for which the peer has
credentials (public and private key pairs) for. Hence, num-
ber of search queries is also in the order of O(| ℵ |).
Potential Dictionary Attacks: The foremost objective of the
index encryption algorithm is to preserve the semantics of
the search process in the form of get() primitive, hence it
must enable searchability of the encrypted index through the
key part of the index entries. Searchability is achieved only
when q-nodes can reproduce the same cipher text equivalent
to the interested ACData item, as was generated by o-nodes
during publishing. This is possible only by using determinis-
tic encryption [49] algorithm (such as RSA/NoPadding). A
deterministic encryption ensures that a given plain text and
key combination always compute to the same cipher text
every time the algorithm is applied. The downside of such
approach is that the value field of index, is subject to dictio-
nary attacks. An arbitrary peer, knowing the public key of a
principal, can place a search request on the items accessible
to only that principal and then construct the complete in-
dex entry using a simple dictionary attack. For instance, an
arbitrary peer can know where a resource virus patch.doc is
stored, by posing the query for the key by encrypting with
the public key of the authorized principal. He can later
try with a list of known peers and encrypting the peer ids
with the same public key and comparing which one of them
matches to the reply obtained for the search query, thus
completing the attack.
However, fortunately, to desist the leakage of the val-
ues to unintended peers due to dictionary attacks, all the
value fields of index entries will be encrypted using a non-
deterministic cryptographic technique. In a non-deterministic
encryption (such as RSA/Padding), a given plain text and
key combination compute to a new cipher text every time
the algorithm is applied. However, all such ciphers decrypt
to the same plain text. This way its impossible to figure out
which one of known values maps to the encrypted value as
every time the algorithm is applied, the cipher text varies.
Only a authorized peer which has the respective private key
can decrypt the value field. Note that if non-deterministic
technique is used for the key- part of index, the searchabil-
ity is lost because the peers can never reproduce the same
cipher originally generated by the publisher.
Level-2 ACPeer System- Publishing and Searching: The above
Level-1.5 system can be improved to a Level-2 system by
encrypting the ACData items with a secret key (instead of
public key of principals) for each principal, which is known
only to the publisher and the authorized principal. A pub-
lisher generates a secret key and encrypts the item with the
secret key, and distributes this secret key either by oﬄine
mode or by encrypting it with the principal’s public key
and publishing it into the network. The authorized peer
first retrieves the encrypted secret key and decrypts it with
its private key, then queries the system with a cipher text
equivalent to the query term encrypted with this secret key.
Since the secret key is not available to other unauthorized
peers, they can not frame valid queries. However, this solu-
tion has inherent scalability problems as the number of such
secret keys required would be in the order of O(| ℵ | 2|ℵ||<|).
In addition, the search overhead also increases significantly
as the number of search queries required to search for an
interested item would be in the order O(| ℵ || Θ |), as one
peer has to search with each accessible principal and for each
potential publisher.
Revocation: It is clear that the CQ based approach relies on
a secured distribution of principals’ credentials to the po-
tential publishers in the system. As a result, the ACPeer
system should support revocation of access privileges due to
not only the updates in ACF by the publisher peer but also,
but also credential updates by some principals. For example,
a principal corresponding to a group of users may update its
credentials if the group membership is updated. Revocation
in CQ-based ACPeer systems can be realized if and only
if additional primitive, namely remove(key)- to remove an
index entry is provided by the underlying DHT. ACData
items published with old credentials can be removed from
the system and republished with new credentials, when a
revocation is requested. This primitive must be realized in
a secured way allowing only the original owner to issue this
operation on the keys he/she has published. Given the fact
that the ACData items are stored on arbitrary untrusted
peers, implementing a reliable deletion operation is chal-
lenging.
To summarize, the CQ based approach keeps the network
protocols intact for realizing a Level-1.5 and Level-2 sys-
tem, but requires key management and distribution infras-
tructure. CQ approach proves to be more suitable for a
Level-1.5 than a Level-2 system. Knowing that an arbitrary
peer which has the public key of a principal can only issue
search queries, public keys should not be distributed indisc-
rimantely in the network. In a typical collaborative working
environment, exchanging of public keys is normally done in
a controlled manner (somewhat similar to distributing email
addresses or personal phone numbers). In such cases, an ap-
plication which need Level-2 semantics can still resort to a
Level-1.5 system based on CQ approach to avoid the addi-
tional overhead caused by Level-2 system. Restricted distri-
bution of public keys limit the exposure of the key-part of
index items to aribitrary peers in the network.
In the next section, we demonstrate the Controlled Replies
(CR) approach based Level-2 system which pushes the ACF
execution into the realms of the r−nodes resulting in a very
simplified system free from complicated key management
inherent to the CQ-based approach.
4.3 Controlled Replies (CR)
In this approach, index entries are stored in an encryption-
free manner, hence, any peer (even unauthorized peer) can
post queries for interested data as the index space is not
obfuscated, in contrary to the CQ-based approach where
peers having the credentials can only pose queries. CR-
based Level-2 system ensures that queries that originate only
from the authorized peers are replied i.e., access to index
is controlled at r-nodes in the same way as done for the
original resources at o-nodes. The r − nodes implement the
necessary reference monitor. Part of complete access control
policy (ACF) corresponding to the respective key, is stored
at r−node along with the index entry, and is checked against
for each incoming query for the key. Since ACF is executed
by r−nodes, we need a trustful mechanism to ensure that a
particular r−node executes the ACF faithfully. To this end,
we introduce the technique of constrained indexing where
o−nodes can control where the index entries corresponding
to the resources they publish, must be stored. The inituition
is that o − nodes can choose such a set of peers based on
the social relationships which host the ACData items on
each other and implement the reference monitors. In the
following sub section, we introduce such a technique which
forms sub overlays with only trusted peers on top of the
overlay. We present insights to various issues arise as part of
the solution and introduce a technique which makes several
promising improvements.
4.3.1 CR with Trusted Sub Overlays (TSO)
Since traditional structured P2P systems assume all peers
to be the same, every peer can be a potential candidate for
storing index of the resources published by other peers. Such
anybody-can-host-anybody’s-index paradigm is no longer suit-
able for realizing a faithful reference monitors. To this end,
we visualize a constrained indexing technique where trust-
worthy communities of peers are formed and members of
the community decide together to host on each other, the
index of the resources they share into the network. These
are the groups of publishers i.e., o− nodes. Each such com-
munity forms a suboverlay on top of the main overlay which
is termed as Trusted Sub Overlay (TSO). Each TSO has its
own identifier space (equivalent to that of the main over-
lay) for the published resources by the TSO members. A
peer in this model, plays two roles one as a member of the
main overlay and the second as a member of one or more
TSOs, hence is responsible for its identifier space as part of
the main overlay and that of the affiliated TSOs. Figure. 2
demonstrates the concept of TSO. Peers p1, p9, and p3 are
part of TSO1 and another overlay TSO2 has p4, p6, p8, and
p9 as its members. Node p1 will publish its data items that
need controlled accesses into TSO1 and any open data items
into the large overlay which includes all the peers from p1
to P11.
As a result, any resource that is hidden inside a TSO must
be identified globally by both the TSO id and the identifier
local to the TSO. To make this possible, we augment the tra-
ditional flat identifier space used to identify the resources in
conventional P2P systems, with a two dimensional identifier
space to identify resources that require controlled accesses
(hidden inside a TSO)- one dimension for identifying the
TSOs and the other dimension for individual resources with
in a TSO. Index and resources that can be publicly accessed
by any peer are published into the main overlay, which are
identified with flat identifiers. Thus, resources which need
controlled accesses are identified with a pair of identifiers
(TSO_ID,resource_ID).
As explained later, the TSOs are used to store ACData
items where as the main overlay is used to host any pub-
lic data including metadata that helps arbitrary peers to
discover and query the TSOs. One form of constrained in-
dexing where the resource indexes are localized based on the
domain names is presented in [50].
TSO Formation: In this model, a set of peers together de-
cide to form a trusted sub overlay, at an arbitrary point of
time. A natural choice for such a trusted group of users
is all members of a research unit in a huge research orga-
nization, or a subset of members of the same project they
are working for. There exist several possibilities regarding
how the peers meet in first place to decide on the sub over-
lay formation. It can be done in a centralized fashion- a
single peer (TSO administrator) can decide to start a TSO
and invite other trusted members into this TSO, or in a de-
centralized fashion- where peers in the community use some
admission control protocol to extend the TSO. An automatic
TSO formation engine can be built which exploits a social
network graph of the peers which forms the TSOs automat-
ically based on some configuration settings- like all peers
which are directly connected to a peer can be part of all
TSOs created by that peer.
Any peer that posess the properties desirable for faithful
ACF execution/trusted reference monitor can be a poten-
tial candidate to be included in a TSO. It is assumed that a
member peer behaves appropriately and cooperates in vari-
ous aspects of the ACF enforcement including but not lim-
ited to, responding to the policy updates from the owner
nodes, executing ACF while replying to the incoming query
requests, and not compromising the system by any means,
for example, sharing the hosted index with unauthorized
peers through back door.
Thus, a TSO can begin with one or more peers and ex-
tend as new peers join by sharing the same TSO identifier.
Thus the new peers share query load and contribute to the
storage of the TSO. We assume that the TSO identifiers are
generated in a unique way as the resource identifiers, for ex-
ample, using hash of IP address of the TSO creation node
together with time of creation. New peers can join a TSO
in two ways: by invitation-only mechanism where a member
peer invites a non-member peer to join the TSO, by self-
join-request mechanism where the new peer itself initiates a
TSO-join request. A TSO’s historical record of ACF execu-
tion would be an excellent reputation metric which enables a
trust worthy TSO to be a favourable TSO to be member of.
This requires techniques for quantifying and modeling the
trust and repuation of TSOs. Such techniques already exist
for the case of a single peer [51] which must be extended
to the case of group of peers, which is a research problem
in itself. All the ACData items published into a TSO are
exposed to all the members of the TSO, which results in the
violation of the ACF rules which is explained in more detail
in the following.
Figure 2: Illustration of Trusted SubOverlays.
Suboverlay Management: An interesting issue that arises in
this model is the routing and management in the sub overlays-
whether the same overlay technology used for the main over-
lay should be used for the sub overlays or a different overlay
technology tailored to a TSO needs should be used. For
example, a TSO topology can be modeled as a broadcast
topology (like in Gnutella) given the small number of nodes
in a TSO, where as the main overlay continues to be a struc-
tured overlay. In fact, each TSO can have its own topol-
ogy and overlay management mechanism independent of all
other TSOs in the system. In some prospective, this model
is interpreted as the main overlay forming a huge substrate
into which several independent secured small substrates are
plugged. This way, each TSO can be plugged into the big
overlay any time so as to make the resources available to
other non-member peers selectively, and can be similarly
unplugged from the overlay. To be explained shorlty, a TSO
is plugged into the overlay by publishing some unsensitive
data about the TSO which enables other non member peers
to discover the TSO and query for the resources published
in the TSO.
Publishing: An ACData item is published into a TSO using
TSO- specific primitives for publishing. These primitives
may be same as that listed in the paper earlier, if the TSO
is managed with a structured overlay technology. A publish
request message must be routed through only the members
of TSO so as prevent any leakage of the index during pub-
lishing phase. Once published, an ACData item is visible to
a set of member nodes of the TSO, which makes it possible
for the members to view the index if they wish. This set
includes the member(s) which is (are) responsible for the
identifier space corresponding to the published resource and
all the intermediate nodes participated in the put operation.
It should be noted that such member nodes may not be au-
thorized to access the resources as per the ACF. However,
we believe that this leakage is tolerable given the kind of
peers that are present in a TSO. This leakage for a TSO
with identifier t w.r.t a member peer m can be quantified
as
Lm(t) = {
∑
∀r∈<m
|M(t)− (ACFm)−1(r) | }− 11
where M(t) is the set of member peers (referred as Member
list or Friends list in the rest of the paper) of the TSO t.
Thus, the total amount of leakage in a TSO L(t) can be
quantified as
L(t) =
∑
∀m∈M(t)
Lm(t)
It should be noted that L(t) = 0 if and only if either M(t) =
1 or every member of M(t) can access every resource pub-
lished by each of the other members. For very sensitive
ACData items, which can not tolerate any leakage, the TSO
size can be kept to be only one where the items are stored on
the owner peer itself. The other alternative is to include only
the members in a TSO such that leakage always amounts to
zero. The latter way of TSO formation is rather very diffi-
cult as it is not always possible to find such a set of peers
which have access to every resource published by each other.
Hence, it is always the case that there exists some leakage in
a TSO. However, we believe that, since a TSO has typically
a fewer number of nodes because TSOs are modeled on so-
cial relationships which are limited in number, the amount
of leakage is always in tolerable limits.
1’-1’ is because M(t) includes the member m itself which is
not present in ACF.
Members of a TSO must publish certain metadata about
the TSO into the main overlay so as to enable other non
member peers to discover the points of contact (entry points)
for the TSO. An entry point of a TSO is any member node
of the TSO. The use of entry points is explained when the
search process in TSOs is explained later.The number of
such entry points in a TSO need not necessarily be equal to
number of member nodes of the TSO so as to facilitate some
nodes hiding their TSO membership information. Entry
point list is a collection of (TSO ID, node ID) pairs. The
authenticity of such an entry point list for a TSO can be en-
sured using cryptographic techniques- for example, each en-
try digitally signed by the administrator of the TSO. We are
investigating sophisticated techniques in this regard. There
can be certificate authorities issuing entry point list certifi-
cates to all legitimate members of a TSO. This way, the
authenticity is verified in the same way public keys are ver-
ified in PKI infrastructures.
When a peer is about to join a TSO, it can measure the
leakage in the TSO w.r.t the peer, and can ignore to join
the TSO if such a leakage is higher than a threshold. In an
invitation-only mechanism, the inviting peer can hand over
the necessary data to compute such leakage metric. We
assume all the control activities necessary to include a new
members into a TSO are done through out-of-band channels
(like emails or other personal communication channels), how
ever providing an in-band mechanism is a goal we pursue
as part of future study. One of the main control activities
relates to admission control- how the current members of
the TSO agree on inviting a new peer and how the status
of a successful join of a new member is propagated to all
members. A very simple approach could be a quorum-based
admission control where in at least a minim quorum of the
current group should accept the new member to be part of
the TSO.
The friends list of a TSO can be cached locally on every
member peer as the TSO grows. Given the size of the TSO,
updating caches on all members, when a member joins or
leaves a TSO, can be done with a reasonable communication
cost. In self-join-request mode, the issue is complicated- how
to safely retrieve the list of TSO members so as to compute
the leakage metric is challenging given that, not every peer
wants to disclose its membership information in a TSO. For
the rest of the discussion, we assume that a peer joins by
invitation-only mechanism only.
It should be noted that a single peer can be part of multi-
ple TSOs each tailored (w.r.t the membership and topology)
to the kind of items hosted inside the TSO. Hence, it can
publish its resources into more than one TSO with selec-
tively choosing which set of resources into which TSO, based
on several criterion. One of the cirteria is the reputation of
the TSO in executing ACF. Other criterion is to choose the
TSO which minimizes the leakage.
Searching: An arbitrary peer can search for the resources
published into the main overlay in the same way using get()
primitive discussed earlier. However, the search for access
controlled data that resides inside TSOs is done in two phases.
First at least one entry point of a TSO should be retrieved
from the main overlay. This is done by querying the main
overlay with the TSO identifier. Then the original query
should be passed to this entry point. One entry point is
chosen randomly in case there are more than one available.
Once the query enters into the TSO overlay, that sub over-
lay’s routing mechanism dictates where this query should be
forwarded from that entry point. Once the peer responsible
for that identifier space sees the query, it invokes the refer-
ence monitor which replies tot he query. Thus, this simple
access control aware search mechanism meets the access con-
trol requirements of the Level-2 system we sketched in the
beginning of the paper.
However, the main question to be asked here is, how the
q−nodes know about in which TSO to search for? It is clear
that with the above simple search mechanism, each peer has
to search in each TSO separately, thus the number of search
queries is in the order of the number of TSOs in the system.
This increased query traffic overhead is acceptable given the
very nature of the problem of ACPeer system. However, if
the querying peer knows about the TSO it has to search
for, there will be maximum two queries over the system-
first to retrieve the entry points and then the actual query.
Hoever, as an improvement, we envisage sophisticated tech-
niques where TSOs publish data descriptors which capture
general broad description of the data hosted inside a TSO
without revealing the identities of the actual data or index,
thus not violating the requirements of a level-2 system. For
example, a TSO that hosts a software project related AC-
Data, can have all the keywords describing the project in
the data descriptor.
Algorithm 3 Simplified algorithms for CR-TSO
1: {The algorithms are simplified for brevity. Each algo-
rithm is run at each peer p in the system.}
2: Publish()
3: {The algorithm assumes that p selects a single TSO for
hosting all of its resources.}
4: choose a TSO t out of all known TSOs such that L(t) is
minimum
5: for all resource r ∈ <p do
6: publish ACData(r) including ((ACF p)−1)(r), into t
using t’s primitives for publishing
7: if Level − 1.5 access control is the requirement for r
then
8: publish (key, TSO Id) pair into main overlay using
put() primitive
9: end if
10: end for
11: Optionally, join entry point list of the TSO
12: Search()
13: if The TSO to search in, is already decided then
14: {either using data descriptors OR interpreting the
TSO identifier OR from the list of TSO identifiers re-
trieved by querying main overlay for interested key}
15: retrieve entry point list of the TSO
16: send query message to one entry point for the inter-
ested key
17: end if
18: if the TSO to search in, is not decided then
19: repeat above in each TSO known
20: end if
For the index which does not require Level-2 access con-
trol, (key, TSO ID) pairs can be published into the main
overlay for all the index entries so that all the TSOs where a
key is available can be retrieved with a single query. Hence,
peers will not end up in failed searches in TSOs that do not
host a particualr key. This improvement provides Level-1.5
semantics for ACPeer system.
Mitigating updates in ACF and TSO membership: One very
promising advantage of CR-TSO approach compared to other
schemes discussed earlier is the ease to handle the updates in
ACF: addition of new rules and especially revocation of ex-
isting rights. Revocation of rights is simple and guaranteed
compared to the earlier mechanisms and is done the same
way as the addition of new rules. The policy change propa-
gation is facilitated with a new primitive put_policy(key,
access list) which is routed to the responsible node which
replaces the old ACF rule for the resources, with the new
one. However, to be noted, the same primitive is used for
the case of revocation of an ACF rule also. However, when
a new put policy() request arrives at a node, it must check
whether the updating node is the owner of the resource or
not. At any point of time, only owner nodes can change
the ACF rule associated with a resource. This is possible
by caching the identity of the owner node when an index
entry is first time published into the network with put() re-
quest. Later on the identity of the updating node should be
checked against this cache so as to allow only owner nodes
to update the ACF. The replication mechanism is assumed
to maintain consistency across replicas of index or resource
entries.
Regarding updates made to TSO w.r.t the membership,
when a new node joins a TSO, it shares the usual query, stor-
age loads as dictated by the overlay management mechanism
used in the TSO. When a node is excluded from a TSO due
to either the member is no longer interested to execute the
ACF of the TSO members or the member is found to be
breaching the faithful execution of the ACF as found out
by out-of-band mechanisms. In any case, the TSO must be
reconstructed excluding the member. The excluded member
then can pose queries for the data hosted in the TSO like
any other non-member peer in the system.
Analysis: The CR-TSO approach provides high configura-
bility to the applications in regard to number of nodes in a
TSO, so that the TSO sizes can be limited, by which, the
degree of vulnerability of the data published is limited. By
selectively choosing which peers can host their index, the
mechanism provides a high degree of faithful ACF execu-
tion. Different P2P protocols can be used for overlay and
TSO management, which is interesting to study the arising
issues and about the right combination of protocols.
On the surface, the CR-TSO approach seems to be anal-
ogous to DPN approach where the former tries to enforce
ACF by localizing data items only to sub overlay networks
created on top of a big overlay, where as the latter does
by independent overlays. The CR-TSO approach can be
interpreted as an improvement over DPN approach, both
share the same philosophy of modeling access control prob-
lem as a variation of admission control problem. In DPN,
we control the members of the whole network where as in
CR, the members of a community are controlled. However,
the CR-TSO approach promises some advantages which are
not possible to be realized with DPN approach. Hence, it is
highly preferred over DPN for realizing ACPeer systems.
• One major advantage with CR-TSO is a node which
is not member of TSO can also issue a query for the
data hosted in the TSO. The Trusted reference monitor
implemented at each TSO will reply to such queries
accordingly. What all a peer needs in order to search
for a resource, is the TSO ID of the TSO it is interested
in. In the case of DPN, a peer must be part of the
network and hence should participate in all the roles
of the network.
• Consider a scenario where a peer has access to only one
resource shared in the network. In the case of DPN,
the peer must be part of the network and thus has
access to all the resources shared which leads to huge
amount of information leakage. In the case of CR, the
peer need not be part of the TSO and still can be al-
lowed to access this single resource alone. It clearly
demonstrates that CR based approach promises in-
creased easiness in managing the access control frame-
work.
• This is advantageous even when a node’s access per-
missions are revoked. In the case of DPN, the entire
P2P network need to be built again excluding the peer.
In the case of CR, only the policy is updated on the
peers in the TSO unless the excluded peer is one of the
members of the TSO itself.
• CR approach is inherently more scalable than the DPN
because in the case of CR-TSO, the applications can
flexibly change ACF without altering the network state
as such, and as described earlier, it is highly config-
urable which is a desired property for any networked
system.
Scope for Improvements: However, as described in the fol-
lowing, the CR-TSO approach lacks on some fronts. Since
the published data is localized inside a TSO only, which has
normally a fewer number of nodes, such data does not match
the availability guarantees possible in the huge public over-
lay due to high number of peers. In general, increased avail-
ability of resources in the light of peer failures is achieved
with the technique of replication. Thus, a smaller sized TSO
can not match the overlay w.r.t the level of geographical di-
versity and the number of peers it provides which are desir-
able characteristics for any high available replication tech-
nique.
Further, management of sub overlay may add further over-
head to underlying overlay management. Overlay manage-
ment overhead includes the cost of maintaining consistent
routing table entries, cost of addition or deletion of a node
to/from the overlay. In the following sub section, we pro-
pose a light weight approach to the CR-TSO case, where
instead of constructing sub overlays on top of the overlay,
the members of a TSO assume a proxy role for the queries
posted onto the TSO. TSO’s published data is stored on the
big overlay with the help of encryption mechanisms.
4.3.2 CR with Trusted Proxy Set (TPS)
CR-TPS is a light weight approach to the CR based Level-
2 system. It nullifies the overhead involved in TSO overlay
management by completely getting the rid of the overlay,
where the members of a TSO instead of forming an overlay
as such, will just assume the role of a set of trusted proxies
with each member of the set acting as a proxy for the queries
targeted at the TSO. Thus each TPS is equivalent to a TSO
w.r.t the set of member nodes. Any potential member of
a TSO can also be a potential member for the correspond-
ing TPS. The same semantics of entry points apply to the
case of TPS also where a subset of TPS members announce
themselves as the entry points/gateways for the TPS, how-
ever, with a slight variation of the role/duty assumed by
the member peers that do not announce themselves as en-
try points. CR-TPS approach inherits from the CR-TSO
approach, the same flexible way of ACF enforcement and
wider availability of storage, from the CQ approach.
The concept of TPS and mechanism of searching is illus-
trated in Figure. 3, where each TSO in Figure. 2 is modeled
as a TPS.
Publishing and Searching: On contrary to CR-TSO approach,
member nodes make use of the storage available on the main
overlay, instead of the storage within the sub overlay only,
for storing ACData items published by them. Before pub-
lishing, the data is encrypted with secret keys known only
to the members of the TPS. In this case, the simplest key
management approach is using a single secret key for every
resource published by the TPS members. This secret key is
defined when the TPS is initially bootstrapped. So any new
member who joins the TPS later simply gets access to this
key. A searching peer first contacts one of the entry points
to the TPS and forwards the query to the node as done in
the case of CR-TSO case. The contacted node converts the
query into equivalent encrypted query with the correspond-
ing encrypted resource identifier and inserts the query onto
the main overlay. Once the node gets the reply, it decrypts
the result and sends to the original querying node. This
way, the members of the TPS act just as proxies for the data
published by the members. In this simple key management
technique, the members which did not announce themselves
as entry points, do not have any role in the search phase,
because such peers will never be contacted by the peers for
searches.
Figure 3: Illustration of Trusted Proxy Set.
However, this simple key management technique leaves
the entire ACData published vulnerable in the case of the
key leakage to unauthorized peers. Hence, several keys can
be used for encrypting the ACData items with list of map-
pings of data item and the key stored at every entry point.
In this case also, the member nodes which do not contribute
to the entry point list will not participate in search phase.
When a peer is excluded from a TPS (for the same rea-
Algorithm 4 Simplified algorithms for CR-TPS
1: {The algorithms are simplified for brevity. Each algo-
rithm is run at each peer p in the system.}
2: Publish()
3: {The algorithm assumes that p selects a single TPS for
hosting all of its resources.}
4: choose a TPS t out of all known TSOs such that L(t) is
minimum
5: for all resource r ∈ <p do
6: encrypt ACData(r) with secret key of TPS t and pub-
lish into main overlay
7: broadcast ((ACF p)−1)(r), into t
8: {assuming that each TPS member maintains ACF of
all TPS members}
9: if Level − 1.5 access control is the requirement for r
then
10: publish (key, TPS Id) pair into main overlay using
put() primitive
11: end if
12: end for
13: Optionally, join entry point list of the TPS
14: Search()
15: if The TPS to search in, is already decided then
16: {either using data descriptors OR interpreting the
TPS identifier OR from the list of TPS identifiers re-
trieved by querying main overlay for interested key}
17: retrieve entry point list of the TPS
18: send query message to one entry point for the inter-
ested key
19: end if
20: if the TPS to search in, is not decided then
21: repeat above in each TPS known
22: end if
sons discussed for the case of TSO), any new data published
after that should be encrypted with new keys which are not
shared with the excluded member. However, the excluded
member will be still able to access data published with old
keys. To minimize the amount of such data, instead of every
member knowing about all the keys used to publish the data,
peers share part of the identifier space and the correspond-
ing keys. This approach introduces the overlay among the
TPS members, which in turn will be analogous to the TSO
model. In this model, members that are not entry points
will also participate in the search phase, as the entry points
have to contact them for any search queries related to the
identifier space shared by those peers.
Analysis: CR-TPS approach frees the system from the need
to manage sub overlays. By building minimal framework
on top of the main overlay technology, it tries to realize a
Level-2 system. To serve search requests, only one member
peer from the entire TPS, is enough to be online, which is
not possible with CR-TSO. Since items are not stored on the
TPS nodes as such, a member can know all of the items pub-
lished by TPS members, only by querying the main overlay.
On the other hand, in CR-TSO, the items are stored on the
nodes and hence exposed to the peers by default. The kind
of leakage in the former case can be termed as hard leakage
where as the latter one as soft leakage. Hard leakage is a
more desirable property of an ACPeer system than a soft
leakage.
Another promising characteristic of TPS approach is, the
framework can be augmented in such a way, multiple peers
together can decide on access control requests in stead of a
single peer as demonstrated above. This can be done using
threshold cryptography where a single secret key can be split
into multiple parts and shared with multiple peers of a TPS,
more than one share is required to construct the original key.
4.4 Hybrid Approach
This approach tries to mix both CQ and CR approaches
together- by encrypting the TSO’s entry points list and lim-
iting access to only the peers who have the key- thus en-
suring a CQ-like ACF enforcement on the metadata used
for TSO/TPS discovery and a CR-like ACF enforcement
for the ACData hosted inside the corresponding TSO/TPS.
This way, the system ensures that not every peer in the main
overlay contacts any TSO/TPS, at the same time ensuring
that access to ACData item is controlled.
4.5 Comparison Analysis
All the approaches discussed in the paper are compared
against each other w.r.t the following criterion in the Table.
1.
• Publication cost measures the number of times the
same single ACData item must be published based on
the number of principals allowed to access. For some
solutions, the same item must be published once for
each principal where as for others, only one instance is
published for all the principals in the system.
• Search cost measures the overhead due to access con-
trol, in terms of number of search queries an arbitrary
peer has to pose to retrieve an interested ACData item.
For a Level-0 system, it is always 1.
• The overhead involved in mitigating with ACF updates
and revocation are captured in the respective criterion.
• Additional requirements capture the potential addi-
tional requirements imposed by the approach for de-
ployment apart from the requirement of strong identi-
ties which is a common requirement for all approaches.
It should be noted that some simple solutions were de-
scribed in the paper for some of the requirements.
• Some approaches have inherent leakage of some AC-
Data to unauthorized peers as part of the design. This
is captured in respective metric.
• Storage capacity available measures the number of peers
available at disposal for storing a published ACData
item, is assumed to capture the level of fault tolerance
available in the system, which is captured in the last
criterion.
5. CONCLUSIONS
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Table 1: Comparison chart
Approach
Criterion Any Level-0
system
DPN CQ CR-TSO CR-TPS Hybrid
Publication
cost
Only once Once per each
authorized
principal OR
only once
depending
on the op-
timization
criterion
Once per each
authorized
principal
Only once Only once Only once
for the AC-
Data items
and once per
each principal
for the TSO
entry point
list
Search cost Only one
search query
for an inter-
ested item
Only once
OR One
search query
per member
principal
depending
on the op-
timization
criterion
For Level-
1.5, as many
queries as
the number
of accessible
principals.
For Level-2
system, it
is number
of principals
* number
of potential
publishers
For Level-1.5,
1+ no. of
TSOs selected
for search.
For Level-2,
twice the
no. of TSOs
selected to
search in
(once for the
entry point
list and once
for the item
search)
3*(no. of
selected CR-
TSOs) since
one more
query for
each search
request be-
cause of extra
indirection
#cost of CQ
+ no. of
TSOs selected
to search in
Policy up-
dates and
revocation
N/A Revocation
needs recon-
structing the
entire pri-
vate network.
Addition of
a new rule
may require
to create a
new private
network.
Revocation
requires re-
moval of old
encrypted
data and
republishing
with new
keys. Ad-
dition of a
new rule is
just sharing
the key with
new set of
principals.
No publica-
tion cost in
either case.
Just the pol-
icy must be
updated with
in the TSO.
Same as CR-
TSO.
#cost of CQ
+ #cost of
CR
Additional
Requirements
N/A Admission
control proto-
cols.
Key man-
agement and
distribution
mechanism.
A light weight
admission
control with
lesser no. of
peers.
A light weight
admission
control with
lesser no.
of peers.
Secret key
management
strategy.
Requirements
for CQ and
CR ap-
proaches.
Leakage to
unauthorized
peers inherent
to the system
N/A Zero Zero Zero with
appropriate
members in
a TSO. Non-
zero but with
in tolerable
limits, in
normal case.
Same as CR-
TSO
Same as CQ
and CR to-
gether.
Available
storage capac-
ity
Entire net-
work of peers.
Limited by
the size of the
private net-
work which
is orders of
magnitude
smaller than
main overlay
Entire net-
work of peers
Limited by
the size of
TSO which
is orders of
magnitude
smaller rela-
tive to main
overlay
Entire net-
work of peers
Depends
on whether
CR-TSO or
CR-TPS is
used.
